The scientific notion of matter as it developed in history cannot be isolated from its philosophical and theological connotations. It is necessary to understand that history and those connotations in order to understand what we might possibly mean today by "materialism". For instance, with Newton matter ceased to be a viable scientific concept. The philosophical stance of materialism, therefore, cannot be attributed, as is commonly held, to classical physics, but rather to a preconceived dualism that opposes matter to spirit and, if one accepts the preconception, has every good reason, on scientific grounds, to eliminate the latter.
Matter for the Ionians and for Aristotle
In a previous paper (Coyne 2009 ) I discussed the early stages of intellectual development whereby the discourse about nature in ancient Egypt, Mesopotamia, Greece and many other parts of the world was framed in the ordinary language of those civilizations. In that context I now wish to discuss how the Greeks of fifth century Ionia, in their attempt to understand the world and themselves in it, started with three quite obvious observations: things are of many kinds and most of them can be classified, things have a beginning and many of them an end, things change. The ancient thinkers sought to get a comprehensive explanation of these three facts. Comprehensive is the important word. How to explain everything? What they did is to assert that there is a "stuff", matter, that is shared by everything they experienced. Matter is what endured through change; matter is what was universally shared but then became specified for different types of things and different individuals of the same types. Did matter have a beginning? Did it have an end? How could this matter come to be so many different things? Were the human being, dust and water of the same matter? This notion of matter was very empirical and sensory; it was "stuff". As time went on this notion created more questions than answers. But the questions were probing ones.
Aristotle abstracts from this empirical "stuff" and then talks of matter in an ambiguous way which creates great problems for the future (Pedersen 2007) . He first talks of matter as the subject of change(s): the leaf which is green today and brown tomorrow; the man who has black hair today and white ten years from now. The leaf and the man are the "matter" of change. But then he also talks of matter when there is a change from one kind of being to another: a seed to a tree, an egg to a chicken. We can speak no more now of a change but rather of a coming to be. Is there a continuity in this coming to be? Is there a "stuff" which endures and, if so, can we detect it? Surely the chicken does not differ from the egg simply by having more "stuff". It is not the quantity of matter which makes a new being. What does? For Aristotle there appears to be a dynamic content to matter. New types of beings seem to come from it. The ambiguities increase. The rarefaction and condensation of matter become important because they explain the differences in the four fundamental types of matter: earth, air, fire and water. But how does one explain the density of matter? The atomists, of course, have the easiest approach. Density is a measure of the space between atoms. But then the difficulties mount: what is space? Is there a void? We are nonetheless at a crucial point; we are beginning to speak of the amount of matter in a given space or of the "quantity of matter". We will soon see that this notion, at least in the physics of motion, will put an end to the notion of matter altogether and give rise to that of mass. And then the notion of mass will become closely allied to that of space.
In addition to the three observations of the ancient Greeks mentioned at the beginning there is the further experience to explain: matter may move. It is in the analysis of motion that further problems about matter come to light. The ancient Greeks discussed falling bodies and suggested that the speed of the fall depended upon the weight of a body and air resistance. But what did it mean for matter to have weight, to be heavy or light? It is interesting that in Aristotle's analysis of both natural and forced motions he makes no use of his concept of matter. It appears that once Aristotle had abstracted from the empirical "stuff" of the Ionians, he would not return to it and consequently would never approach the notion of a quantity of matter. For Aristotle matter became a principle of being.
This principle is referred to as "primary matter" and it is that which underlies the changes from one type of being to another: the seed to the tree, the egg to the chicken. Further analysis of this principle shows that it is completely indeterminate, cannot be named or described but has the potentiality to be "informed", i.e., to be made definite, intelligible, actual, predictable, spiritual, etc. It is no exaggeration, I think, to say that it is in this Aristotelian notion of "primary matter" that we have the origin of the sharp, and sometimes misleading, distinctions that are to arise in Western thought between material, spiritual, living, non-living, etc. It is a notion that invites a challenge. If "primary matter" is indeterminate, pure potentiality and cannot be named or described, how does it explain anything? Does it exist? What is meant by calling it a "principle"? It was the defining of such principles which became the main task of Greek physics. At a minimum we can assert that this made Greek physics into philosophy and that the birth of modern science in the 17th century was to initiate a completely new, and even contrasting, way of doing physics, separating it altogether from philosophy.
Matter at the Birth of Modern Science. Newton and His Contemporaries
From the notion of the Ionians of matter as "stuff" to the philosophical principle of the Aristotelians allow me to leap over the intervening centuries, which were dominated by Aristotelianism, to the 17th century. I will concentrate on the thought of Isaac Newton, while contrasting him with other scientists of his time. If one considers only his major work, the Principia, one could assert that Newton virtually eliminated the concept of matter from physics by replacing it with the notion, "quantity of matter", which will soon become "mass". However, by examining Newton's other writings and correspondence one sees that he struggled for sixty years with the notion of "matter" (McMullin 1978) .
Newton was primarily interested in the notions of force, of body, and of the existence or non-existence of the void. But basic to all of these was the concept of matter and he was always drawn to the neo-Platonic emphasis on matter as inert and totally passive. Newton's preoccupation here was a theological one. He would not risk having an autonomous world which did not depend on God. But if there was no seat of action in matter, where was it? How and where did change originate? Although in the Principia Newton claims that he is seeking only for a mathematical explanation of motion, he is actually searching, if one judges by his other writings, for the real, physical source of changes in motion. His approach is a very inductive one. Matter for him is not at all the co-principle of substance as in Aristotle. Typical of his approach is his claim that: "The laws and properties of all bodies on which experiments can be made, are the laws and properties of bodies universally (Cohen 1966) .
In Rule III of the Principia Newton states that "to be material is to be extended, solid, mobile, to possess inertia, to attract and to be attracted by all other bodies". For the first time attraction is added to the classical list of the qualities associated with materiality and it is, of course, in analyzing attraction that Newton begins a totally new discourse on the nature of matter.
Contrary to Descartes, Newton states that while all matter is extended not all extension is matter. He is here undoubtedly alluding to the nature of space and of the void and this will lead him to a lengthy treatment of action at a distance. Contrary to his own tendencies Newton appears to make matter active since all material bodies attract and are attracted. He seeks to avoid this by seizing upon force as the principle of activity. Here again he is in contrast to Descartes who immediately went to God as the source of activity. Furthermore, Descartes delayed the development of the concept of mass by his exclusively geometrical notion of matter. For him matter and extension were equivalent and volume substitutes for mass (Jammer 1961) .
Because of his desire to maintain matter as inactive there is a tension in Newton's thinking on the relationship of matter and force. He had the insight to realize that force was only required to explain a change of motion, including going from rest to motion. But for him matter offered a resistance to motion and resistance to him was activity. This leads him to the concept of inertial force proportional to the "quantity of matter". But where is this inertial force? Leibniz with his monads clearly puts this force in matter. Newton cannot do that. His hesitation to make matter active and his struggle to deal with the notion of action at a distance are, in my opinion, correct instincts which will eventually lead to the development in physics of force fields. It is of some interest to note that in the cases of both Leibniz, who made matter active, and of Newton, who refused to do so, the motivation was theological. Leibniz thought it would be demeaning of God to require that he always be acting in matter and Newton felt that God would easily be excluded altogether if he were not the immediate source of activity in matter.
In light of these diverse views as to activity in matter we might ask: Was gravity essential to matter? For Newton the answer was clearly negative because he could not accept the notion of essential. To him essence was an ontological principle of being inherited from the Aristotelians and his was an inductive and empirical notion of matter. For him gravity was universal, but it was not essential. For Newton matter continued to be a substratum for all empirical properties, including attraction.
We now summarize the most important elements of Newton's physics with respect to matter. He rejected the Aristotelian notion of prime matter as an ontological principle of all created being in favor of a return to the Ionian notion of matter as a substratum for the empirical qualities which he studied by induction. He struggled to eliminate the notion of matter being active but, in so doing, he could not ultimately explain his notion of the "force of inertia" and the attractive force of all matter. In proposing the notion of "quantity of matter" he leads the way to the concept of mass. From Newton on matter is eliminated from the discourse of physics and is replaced by mass. As has been noted by others (Heller 1988 , McMullin 1978 it is paradoxical that the rise of materialism as a philosophy in the 17th and 18th centuries is attributed by some to the birth of modern science, when in reality matter as a workable concept had been eliminated from scientific discourse. Matter, in the new physics, is not measurable.
Matter in Physics after Newton
Newton typifies the struggles with the notion of matter in physics at the time of the birth of modern science. To complete this picture somewhat, let us now examine a bit of the aftermath of Newton. In 1763 Roger Boscovich in his Theory of Natural Philosophy (Rowlinson 2002) introduces the notion of point centers of force, instead of extended solid corpuscles. These point centers have inertia and a single force acting at these point sources is supposed to explain all of the qualities of matter. There is thus a tendency in Boscovich to the reification of force, to making it the "stuff" of the Ionians and the substratum of Newton. This tendency is furthered, although not intentionally, by Euler in his mathematics on the mechanics of fluid media. Euler opposed the reification of forces and he believed in the ether. But in his Principia motus fluidorum (1761) he presented an idealized mathematical model for the transmission of action in a continuous medium (Darrigol and Frisch 2008) . This mathematization soon led others to develop the notion of force fields whereby the relationship of bodies to one another is characterized by the specification of forces in a space-time coordinate system. Was a medium required for the exercise of these forces? What was a "field"? Faraday specified these questions by formulating empirical criteria for claiming that a particular field involved real processes in intervening space (Harman 1982) . By his criteria optical, electrical and magnetic fields are real, whereas gravity is action at a distance. Except for gravity this seemed to require an ether but all attempts to find such an ether failed. Maxwell's unification of light, electricity and magnetism in a single mathematical formulation still left the question of an ether unresolved (Maxwell 1865 ). Hertz led the movement towards the inevitable defeat of ether theories with his statement: "Maxwell's theory is Maxwell's system of equations" and with his reproach of those who tried to cloth the mathematical equations with the "gay garment" of a physical counterpart (Hertz 1892) . The reality is the mathematical formulation of the reality. The advent of relativity theory, of quantum field theory, of quantum cosmology, etc. will only further complicate the discussion of the nature of matter as to action at a distance.
The mathematization of physics that we have just been addressing will continue through the classical revolution in physics of the 17th and 18th centuries and will become, in a different way as we shall see, an essential ingredient of the new physics of the 20th century. As usual in scientific revolutions, what was happening only came to full realization after it had happened. A three-layered conception of the universe, only partially inherited from the Platonic-Pythagorean tradition, came to be accepted implicitly, and only slowly did it come to consciousness. There was the layer of the true mathematics, the mathematical structures of which the world is truly made. Then there was the second layer, the mathematics of us humans, structures which were in a Platonic sense only the shadows of the first layer. Finally there were at the third layer the images in concrete reality of the true mathematical structures which we humans attempted to understand with our shadow mathematics. However, there is a subtle development in which at the second layer mathematics is not only the language or the interpretative tool of physics, but it becomes also the "stuff" of the ideal world of physics (Heller 1996) . For the present this "stuff" remained under the control of empirical verification i.e., the third layer. The images in concrete reality remained the test of how true the human mathematical structures were.
The rise of quantum mechanics and of relativity theory at the beginning of the 20 th century soon weakened the connection between the second and third layers described above and, in fact, reemphasized the connection between the second and first layers. The images in concrete reality made very little, if any, sense as a test of mathematical "stuff" of the ideal world of physics. There are no natural images or representations which correspond to Hilbert spaces, the mathematical "stuff" of quantum theory. And while general relativity has passed all of the experiments yet made to test its empirical predictions there are no adequate images or representations which correspond to motions at relativistic velocities or under very large gravitational forces. In its "purest" form the physics of both the sub-quantum world and the world "beyond-relativity" is strictly mathematical in the tradition of Plato and Pythagoras and has little to do with any sensory component.
There is another area in which the new physics has advanced our understanding of the nature of matter. The studies of the dynamics of non-linear systems have given birth to the fields of chaos theory and complexity (Russell, Murphy, and Peacocke 1995) . This represents, in some sense, a return from quantum physics to the world of macroscopic physics and it is, in another limited sense, a vindication of Aristotle's view that the world of the senses is too rich to be limited to or comprehended by mathematics. There are really two parts of this: deterministic chaos arising from classical mechanics and non-linear systems in thermodynamics. The immense variety of forms, shapes, and structures, which we find in both the inorganic and organic world, challenges any theory that they could have come forth from some deterministic set of laws of physics. And yet, using the mathematical analysis of non-linear systems and the laws of physics, we can come to understand the structural design for changes, but we cannot predict the result because we cannot know what result small perturbations, accumulated in a non-linear way, will produce. Thus while we can analyze mathematically and, in that sense, understand the structure of such dynamical systems, we cannot predict the outcome because of the accumulative effect of non-linear perturbations. In the end the world of the senses has a richness which defies ultimate mathematical analysis.
From Physics to the Biosciences
This leads us rather naturally from the world of physics to that of chemistry and biology, of biophysics and biochemistry. The very fact that we have such developed fields of dual denomination is an indication of the direction in which the discourse is now directed. As in physics so in the biosciences, from the history traced above, matter can no longer be understood in a reductionist sense, that is, materialism. How then should matter be understood? The well established scientific evidence of the complexification of matter in the evolutionary process leads me to suggest that we have returned once again to the notion of matter as a substratum, but now that notion is much enriched both by the mathematics of non-linear systems and by our knowledge of biochemistry. What now dominates our thinking, as it did for physics in the case of the historical development towards field theories, is the concept of relationship.
No part of the universe can be understood except in its dynamical and evolutionary relationship to all other parts of the universe. The specification of matter (an electron, a quark, DNA, the human brain, etc.) is attained by its relationship to and interaction with all other parts and with the whole. The best of scientific knowledge tells us that all of the diverse objects in nature have had a common origin and have shared in and come from a common evolutionary process.
An initial eruption of energy soon gave birth to the first matter in the universe in the form of quarks which in turn formed the first sub-atomic particles until finally the simplest of all atoms, hydrogen, was formed. As the universe continued to expand and cool, matter continued to organize itself in ever more complex structures: haloes of dark matter, molecules, dust, galaxies, stars, proto-organic substances, vegetation, mammals. This evolution in an ever expanding universe evolving towards ever more complex organization of material required also a diversification of the original energy of the universe into various forces: nuclear, electromagnetic and gravitational.
Over the centuries the debate has persisted over the relative place of chance and determinism in this evolutionary process. While the laws, for example, of physics as we know them are quite deterministic, -given a cause the effect follows inevitably -we know today of many systems which are non-deterministic, or in the language of mathematics, non-linear systems. These are systems, whether physical, chemical or biological, where, although the causes or concatenation of causes are all defined and known, we cannot predict the final effect, because an undetermined and undeterminable series of fluctuations intervenes between cause and effect. This non-linearity becomes more dominant as evolution proceeds to ever more complex systems.
Pure chance is not in itself a satisfactory explanation for this increasing complexification. But we might still ask to what extent chance played a role. The philosophical inclinations of Albert Einstein are rather complex. In his physics, however, he was clearly deterministic. In the debate over the meaning of quantum mechanical indeterminism he claimed that God does not play with dice (Isaacson 2007) . In attempting to frame a different conclusion in the context of Einstein's statement, Christian de Duve claims that intrinsic to the universe there is a dynamical interaction of determinism, chance, and opportunity. His response to Einstein was to state that in a sense the dice were loaded, since it is in the very nature of the universe that intelligent life inevitably come to be, although a long and complicated process involving laws, chance happenings and propitious opportunities was required (de Duve 1995 (de Duve , 1997 .
Dualism Challenged by Continuity in Evolution
As we have seen, throughout the historical development of the notion of matter there has been a dominant tendency towards dualism in the origins and evolution of the universe. I have suggested above that this tendency was strongly supported by the Aristotelian notion of prime matter as a principle of indeterminacy and potentiality for change, even to new kinds of beings. A further contribution to this dualistic tendency comes from theological considerations. We have seen an example of this in Newton and Descartes and in their contemporaries. Descartes in particular required two levels of being: matter and spirit, and matter was completely inactive, motion having been communicated to it by God at creation (Sorell 2000) . This tendency endures to our day. In order to preserve the primacy of God, of the spiritual, of the supernatural some have found it necessary to insert discrete moments in the continuous evolutionary process which we have described above. According to this position, organic could not arise from inorganic, life could not come from non-life, the human intelligence and spirit could not come from matter. God must have intervened at these critical phases in evolution, especially at the coming to be of the human being. Such positions appear to contrast with the most recent scientific evidence available which sees a continuity in the natural processes which lead to the complexification of matter in the universe. This dualistic tendency is usually resolved in one of two extreme ways: materialism or divine intervention. Put in its most simple expression crass materialism will not allow that complexification in the evolutionary process can lead to new kinds of beings. All beings, however, complex, are reducible to their material parts. At the other extreme, is the position that essentially new beings, and especially the human being, require a direct intervention by God in the evolutionary process. Materialism, as I have described it, is, I believe, essentially refuted as an inadequate view of what is meant today by material, that all beings are related to all other beings in the universe in their common origin and common evolution towards more complex systems. The need for an interventionist God is essentially refuted by the scientifically well established continuity in the evolutionary process and its explicability in a scientific analysis which need not be a threat to informed theological thought.
A specific example of the tension that exists for theology on these issues is given in a brief message on evolution of John Paul II to the members of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences (John Paul II 1996) . I have discussed this in some detail previously (Coyne 2009 ) and I would now like to summarize that discussion and proceed from the conclusions I presented there. The crux of the message is the discussion of the opposing theories of evolutionism and creationism as to the origins of the human person. Traditional teaching has been that, although the human body may take its origins from pre-existent living matter, the spiritual soul is immediately created by God. And so, is everything resolved by embracing evolutionism as to the body and creationism as to the soul? What is being proposed is an "ontological leap", an "ontological discontinuity" in the evolutionary chain at the emergence of the human being. If we correctly understand emergence, is an ontological leap necessary? Does revealed, theological truth require a dualistic view of the origins of the human person, evolutionist with respect to the material dimension, creationist with respect to the spiritual dimension? I wish to suggest that the fusion of the theological notion of continuous creation and the scientific-philosophical notion of emergence, considered together, may advance the continuing dialogue between science and Judeo-Christian theology on this critical issue.
Continuous creation and emergence
Reflections upon the God's continuous creation may help to advance the dialogue with respect to the dualistic dilemma mentioned above. God acts continuously through the process of evolution. Since there can ultimately be no contradiction between true science and revealed, theological truths, this continuous activity is best understood in terms of the best scientific understanding of the emergence of the human being.
It is important, first of all, to understand the theological concept of creation in the Judeo-Christian tradition. It does not express an act of God performed 13.8 billion years ago. In fact, it does not at all express an act of God neither a one-time act nor a continuous activity. In fact, in the Book of Genesis the correct translation of the Hebrew phrase, Bereshith' bara' Elohim, is "when God began to create." The theological notion of creation rather expresses a three-fold belief: God is one, everything that exists depends on God for its existence, there was nothing except God before things came to be. The classical phrase for this three-fold belief is creatio ex nihilo (creation from nothing). Creation as an activity of God is understood informally in many ways (Clifford 1995) but I propose that it is important to maintain this three-fold fundamental understanding, so as to avoid confusion as we proceed. I will, therefore, speak of God's activity in creation, referring to creation in the objective sense as the sum of all that exists. The fundamental theological belief here is that God is active in creation, although we must be careful to realize that human agency is only an analog of divine agency. The challenge is to understand God's activity in light of our scientific understanding of creation (Russell, Murphy, and Stoeger 2008) . A further caveat is that when we speak of creation theologically we are not speaking of origins, of beginnings (Coyne 2001) . Science deals with the questions of origins, of how what we observe and experience today came to be. The question of creation, and therefore of a God Creator, responds to the question of why there is anything in existence. Creation is not one of the ways whereby things originated as opposed to other ways that can be thought of, including, for instance, quantum cosmology and evolutionary biology.
Might the theological belief in the continuous activity of God in creation be illuminated by the philosophical-scientific understanding of emergence in the evolutionary process. Emergence is usually understood to be the coming to be of a new being from preexisting beings. The emphasis here is upon new. A common expression for this phenomenon is that the whole is more than the sum of the parts. But the resulting whole can be at various levels of being: water is not just the sum of hydrogen and oxygen, a tree is not just the sum of roots and branches and leaves, a bird is not just the sum of cells and organs and feathers, a human is not just the sum of flesh and blood (Deacon 2007) . Are we at a more mature level of addressing the same questions the Ionians sought to answer as discussed in Sec. 1? While there may be an analogy among the emergent processes whereby new beings at various levels emerge, it is important to recognize what appears to be the uniqueness of the emergence of mind and spirit from matter. Can such an emergence be understood in such a way as to avoid the dualistic tendencies discussed in Sec. 5? Can the human spirit be understood, in at least a limited way, as emerging from matter (the human brain) without being reduced to matter? Christian belief has always and consistently resisted a reductionism (John Paul II 1996) . But, is the whole human being more than matter and spirit? Science, of course, cannot adequately address these questions, since it cannot deal with the spiritual, but it might provide some approach through an analogical understanding of emergence at other levels.
It is important here that we distinguish between intelligence and spirit, although neither can be carefully defined. Intelligence is the capacity to think, to reason, to be self conscious, to communicate. Spirit is the opening toward the transcendent, to that which is beyond reason, to God in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Spirit is the realm of theological belief and, although it relies upon intelligence, it transcends it. Some of the most compelling expressions of this relationship of spirit to intelligence are the following ones of Abraham Joshua Heschel (Heschel 1951) . "The attempt to convey what we see and cannot say is the everlasting theme of mankind's unfinished symphony, a venture in which adequacy is never achieved (p. 4)." "Much of the wisdom inherent in our consciousness is the root, rather than the fruit, of reason (p. 17)." "All we know of the self is its expression but the self is never fully expressed. . . . Like the burning bush, the self is aflame but never consumed. (p. 46)." Consequently, when we speak of levels of emergence we must be careful to distinguish between the intelligent and the spiritual. In this regard John Paul II in the speech I referred to in Sec. 5 (John Paul II 1996) says that while the spiritual cannot be the object of purely intelligent analysis, intelligence can nevertheless discover a series of very valuable signs indicating what is specific to the human being.
The very nature of our emergence in an evolving universe and our inability to completely comprehend it, even with all that we know from cosmology, may be an indication that in the universe God may be communicating much more than information to us. Through the limitations of science we might come to see the universe as a unique revelation of God, that He is Love, the one to whom the human spirit is directed and who revealed himself and continues to reveal himself to us in time. We must realize that his communication to us is more than one of information. It is rather a self-giving of God himself in love. The response of a believer goes beyond intelligence. But even more challenging is the obvious fact that our response is anthropocentric. God's revelation is to us; it could not be otherwise. The existence of extra-terrestrial intelligence must be taken as a serious possibility with all of its consequences. The possibility that extra-terrestrial intelligence may also be spiritual strains our anthropocentric reception of God's revelations to us. If, for instance, those extra-terrestrials had sinned and were redeemed by God, then we might wonder how God redeemed them. The history of theology has shown, however, that anthropocentricism does not necessarily imply exclusivity. There is deeply embedded in Christian theology, throughout the Old and New Testament but especially in St. Paul and in St. John the Evangelist, the notion of the universality of God's redemption and even the notion that all of creation, even the inanimate, participates in some way in his redemption. (Maldari 2015) . But again that is an anthropocentric declaration.
But does the contingency in the emergence of the human being as seen by science contradict theological truth? Not, it appears to me, if theologians can develop a more profound understanding of emergence in terms of God's continuous creation. God in his infinite freedom continuously creates a world which reflects that freedom at all levels of the evolutionary process to greater and greater complexity. God lets the world be what it will be in its continuous evolution. He does not intervene, but rather allows, participates, loves. Is such thinking adequate to preserve the special character attributed by theology to the emergence of spirit, while avoiding a crude creationism? This is a very crucial question for theology.
There is strong evidence that emergence is a fundamental feature of the natural world (Murphy and Stoeger 2007) . Might emergence assist us in a limited understanding of the spiritual, of that beyond the natural world, as I have discussed it above? God's continuous creation is in continuity with the temporal nature of creation, with the emergence over a long period of time of life, consciousness and spiritual experience (Clayton 2007) . The Bible, according to its various literary genres, presents God as intimately related to the universe and to humans (Clifford 1995) . Of course, there is no explicit treatment of emergence as such in the Bible but emergence is consistent with and, indeed, supported by the biblical presentation of God's activity in the universe. This need not be in contrast with the absolute, eternal God of classical theology. The eternal God has in his eternity a potentiality for relationships with a universe and that potentiality is actualized in time as the universe evolves and increasingly complex levels of being emerge. Why should the emergence of spiritual beings, humans, be any exception to this series of God's potentialities being actualized? The fusion of the theological beliefs in an absolute eternal God, a Creator God, and a God active in the world through the realization in time of his potentialities through the emergence of ever more complex levels of being, including spiritual beings, provides a way to avoid a persistent dualistic understanding of the nature of the human being.
Summary
From the time of the Golden Age of Greek civilization there has been a persistent dualistic tendency in the attempt to understand the human being as both matter and spirit. At the birth of modern science, especially with Isaac Newton, matter ceased to be a viable concept and it was replaced by the notion of mass. The attempts to understand the role of mass soon leads to an understanding of the forces of nature in terms of force fields. This leads to an increasing mathematization of physics and to the birth of special and general relativity, to quantum mechanics, and to the dynamics of non-linear systems. The world of physics is becoming ever more abstract and indeterminate. Consistent with these developments Darwinian evolution presents the contingent nature in the coming to be of living systems. This provides a further challenge to an understanding of the nature of the human being. There arise two tendencies to explain what appears to be a dualistic nature of the human being: matter and spirit. One tendency is a radical materialism; the other is an interventionist God who creates the human spirit. An attempt to provide an answer to dualism is given by the fusion of the theological view of a God active in creation with the philosophical-scientific concept of emergence in the evolutionary process.
